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## PALESTINE: TWO STATES AGAINST PROLETARIAT

The thousands of dead, wounded, tortured and imprisoned represent only the top of the mountain of suffering experienced by Palestinian and Israeli proletarians, opposed by an endless conflict that does not belong to them. This bitter confrontation, with dual dimension of war between two bourgeois states and civil war between two peoples, is itself a hostage and the pretext of all economic, political, diplomatic and military webs that imperialism either large or small weave in the region since the Second World War.

Even today, on behalf of the Palestinian cause, the mads of God from West and East bring iron across the Middle East, the Caucasian countries, to the Far East. Imperialist international coalitions form and break on behalf of the resolution - never really wanted, always called aloud - to that question. According to the future belligerents, the next war in Iraq also will be on its behalf. But what is it and, more importantly, what the new Israeli-Palestinian war means for the proletariat in the region and more broadly for the world working class?

Before considering the current situation in all these aspects and try to see the possibility of proletarian upheaval, it is necessary to revisit the recent history since the first intifada.

### ***SOME ASPECTS OF RECENT HISTORY***

#### *Oslo agreements announced bankruptcy*

The Oslo Agreements, it is necessary to recall, were signed in 1993, after the Iraq war, during triumph of USA and its ally Israel as the PLO was in dire straits. They put into place for an interim period of five years, a Palestinian Authority whose jurisdiction would cover the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The solution of the thorniest issues, including refugees, Jerusalem and settlements was postponed to final negotiations.

Two years after the transitional period, ie on 4 May 1996, were to begin discussions on the final status of the West Bank, Gaza and Jerusalem. But from the beginning, the Labor government jimbs and brakes hard to gain time to create an irreversible balance of power and put Palestinian Authority with an accomplished fact.

To begin, some commitments have not been met, such as the construction of a safe passage between the West Bank and Gaza, the release of Palestinian political prisoners and the settlement of the claim of right to return for displaced persons in 1967. No arbitration mechanism was provided for violation of agreements by one party, the U.S. fairy always finshing to rally around the positions of the Labor Government.

Thus, it blithely continued to pursue the policy of colonization, followed by the right led by Benjamin Netanyahu, after taking power in May 1996. Between 1993 and 1998, the number of settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip has increased from 110,000 to 169,000. These settlements are of course the responsibility of the State of Israel. They are all located in Area C, as defined by the Oslo 2 agreements of 28 September 1995, which divided the West Bank into three areas A, B and C. Area C is under full administrative and military contro, of Israel. It covers about 60% of the territory and includes the whole of the Israeli population in the West Bank and 10% of the Palestinian population.

The vast majority of water sources is located in Area C. As soon as 1967, water from the territories occupied by Israel was placed under military control and Arab residents were prohibited from digging new wells, while the Jewish settlements can dig without restriction. The World Bank estimates that 90% of water in the West Bank is used for the benefit of Israel, the Palestinians left with only 10% remaining.

According to several official sources, the 'great pacifist' Yitzhak Rabin - adopting the views of the army about the territorial concessions compatible with country's security and protection of the settlements - was not ready, after the interim period, to give Palestinian Authority more than half of the West Bank.

Thus, after the period of autonomy, the Authority can effectively control (militarily and administratively) only 10% of the West Bank and two-thirds of Gaza. For the Israeli government, the benefits of this peace process are impressive. Indeed, it has mainly not to provide security in Palestinian areas, the cops of Arafat do that. He got rid of much of the financial burden of the occupation since the international community, through a massive injection of capital, allows the Palestinians to survive and the clique of Arafat to become fat cats. He was able to continue the colonization of the strategic areas of the West Bank and the "Judaization" of East Jerusalem.

### *From Oslo 2 to Camp David*

The Camp David summit, held from 11 to 25 July 2000, was to address the most important points of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute: the plight of refugees, the status of Jerusalem, the future of settlements, the border demarcation. In accordance with resolution 242 of the Security Council of the United Nations, the Palestinian Authority demanded the return of sovereignty in any part of Jerusalem arab side occupied in 1967, however, leaving in Israel the Jewish intramural quarter and the Wailing Wall.

The Israeli government, for its part, is willing to grant sovereignty to the Palestinian Authority only on neighborhoods and villages and a sort of autonomy in the Muslim and Christian quarters of the Old City and areas outside the walls. The Authority could have install the capital of his state. In addition, Israel has proposed the return of more than 90% of the West Bank, the rest - which includes most of the colonies - being annexed. The territorial concessions proposed by the Labor Chairman of the Board Ehud Barak correspond to a smaller version of these 22% of the country which had been left to the Palestinians after the war of 1948-1949.

As for refugees, products of the Zionist policy of ethnic cleansing of 1948 which has deprived the Palestinian representative to nearly half of its Arab population, Israel proposed absorption of ten years from 5,000 to 10,000 refugees and rejected any notion of the right of return (resolution 194 of the United Nations), and any recognition of its historic responsibility in creating the refugee problem. For Israel, there is no question that Palestinian refugees from the territory in its pre-1967 borders return on its soil. The bankruptcy of this ultimate American attempt to defuse the most dangerous Middle East geostrategic bomb is due in equal parts by the two States directly involved.

The few informal interviews and summits that followed Camp David (including those in Sharm el-Sheikh on 17 October 2000 and Taba in late January 2001) will not bring any additional element. A few days before the Israeli elections of 6 February 2001, all official contacts between the two States was interrupted.

Therefore, on the Palestinian side, it became ever more obvious that the PLO concessions to Israel, did nothing concrete to the vast majority of the population in the West Bank and Gaza. Worse, the material situation of palestinian population get worse despite astounding promises made on time of the Oslo Agreements signing, to open an era of peace and prosperity for the people of the region. Therefore, it is clear that seven years after the start of the famous agreements, with the exception of the corrupted minority that lives on Fatah clientelism and on redistribution of subsidies that it operates on international aid, for vast majority autonomy means settlement continuation, unemployment rising and repression worsening.

***CENTRAL ROLE OF ECONOMICAL DIMENSION WITHIN CONFLICT****Israel : specter of crisis resurfaced*

According to the latest report from the country's central bank, in 2001, Israel has experienced the first recession in its history (-0.6% of GDP). The same will happen this year (-1%) and next year (estimations around a further decline of 1%). The last cyclical crisis in the United States has considerably narrowed the export markets of israelian ICT (information and communication technologies) and the war in the West Bank and Gaza leads Israeli economy to the brink of the abyss. You should know that half of Israel's GDP is generated by exports, including exports of goods classified high-tech. The indicators point to a major crisis. Industrial production is in steep decline since 2001 (-4% over the first eight months of the year), while prices should rise by around 6 to 8% in 2002 (compared with an increase in 1.4% in 2001).

If one excludes the nationalized sector fuelled by government spending, GDP fell by 2.4% in 2001 and is projected to decline by 2.9% in 2002, according to the Leumi Bank. The turnover of the tourism fell by 50% in 2001 (the first decline since 1953) and is expected to lose 80% in 2002, thus removing 1.5 to 2 percentage points to GDP. Exports are expected to be down 5% in 2002 after a decline of 11.7% in 2001. The trade deficit was 1.9 billion dollars in 2001 jumped to 3.5 billion in 2002.

Unemployment has already reached 10.6%, a level never reached. According to estimates by the Bank of Israel, it could reach a rate from 12 to 13% in 2003. A study based on small ads indicates that the job offers had fallen by 30% in third quarter 2002 compared to the last year same period. One in five person, or 1.17 million people and one in four children lived last year under the poverty line in Israel, according to an official report of the Social Insurance Office issued on 4 November 2002. The poverty line is set at 2,768 shekels (about 550 dollars) per month for a couple without children.

The number of Israelis living below the poverty line has increased in 2001 by 81,000 people. It is also clear that the gap between rich and poor, already very high in Israel, has further widened in 2001. Revenues of 30% of the poorest of the population accounted for only 3.5% of total income in 2001, against 4,5% the previous year. However, the incomes of the richest 20% of the population accounted for 54% of country total income. Poverty hits particularly the Arab minority (18% of the population) and residents of new towns, called "of development", which welcome new immigrants. The national currency is attacked on the international money markets, so it has depreciated by over 16% since 2000. The share prices fell by almost a third since 1 January 2002. The FDI (Foreign direct investments) have melted. While in first quarter 2000, their net balance has a positive figure of \$ 3.3 billion, since mid-2001, they rose to negative figure of \$ 300 million.

The crisis has resulted in lower revenue for the state and a public debt upward causing a real threat of higher interest rates on government bonds on the international credit markets. At height of 100% of GDP in 2001, the debt is currently in climbing phase (103% of GDP in mid-2002), partly because of military expenditures related to the second intifada. The military budget - 9 billion dollars per year, or 17% of the total public expenditure - increased by 1,5 billion since the start of the clashes.

About 25,000 reservists have been recalled, costing the state directly about 120 million dollars per month. According to the Head of Research of the Bank of Israel, the total cost to the economy of the first fifteen months of the intifada was 2,5 billion dollars.

Another major cause of the recurring deficit of public finances (0,6% of GDP in 2000, 4,5% in 2001), the religious parties have extorted, in exchange for their support for the successive government coalitions, a growing tithe for their customers. Financing 221,000 religious students each receiving \$ 150 monthly costs the state more than \$ 400 million per year. Because of their existence and their numerical growth, the employment rate of adults between 25 and 54 years old, from 93.5% in 1970 rose to 85.7% in 1993. In other industrialized countries the rate is about 94%.

These major sources of chronic public expenditure position the State of Israel in a permanent beggar position. It receives about \$ 6 billion in external aid business (United States, contributions from the

diaspora and German reparations) per year. In 2002, the assistance of the United States is divided as follows: 720 million dollars of economic support and assistance of 2 billion for defence.

The poor situation of state funds has imposed in May 2002, to Sharon government the adoption of a first austerity plan, including the 2,5% decline in public spending, a point more for VAT with the increase in tax income, 4% diminution for family allowances (and 24% for those whose parents have not served in the army, namely the Israeli Arabs and religious), the minimum wage freeze, the tightening of conditions for access to unemployment insurance and the reduction of 5% of elected representatives.

#### *A crisis with familiar looks*

The current crisis looks like that of 1984. At that time, the inflation rate rises to three digits and external debt reached 23 billion dollars. At the same time, state enterprises or single union enterprises, the Histadrut (40% of workers in the country are employees) are still applying criteria for the management of "real socialism" in the Russian dressing. Labour productivity remains insufficient because investment are shrinking gradually. Indeed, tax revenues are used primarily to finance army, debt and welfare system.

Faced with the economic crisis worsened by the management of Likud - primarily interested in maintaining its control over the state apparatus -, adopted measures are draconian. The new national unity government launched a tough austerity plan: reducing subsidies to basic and agricultural commodities, devaluation, lowering of real wages, freezing prices and high interest rates. The army withdrew from Lebanon and the United States added \$ 1.5 billion to 3 billion annual usual. Large State-owned companies are being dismantled, restructured or privatized.

#### *From 1985 to 1996, a quick growth*

On this new basis the industrial production flies between 1985 and 1989. The growth of labor productivity coupled with the effects of restructuring the state sector has resulted in a significant increase in the unemployment rate from 6 to 9%. In this period, the only major export industry is weapons that represent a quarter of sales, far ahead of the agricultural products.

Massive immigration from Russia then the opening of new markets following the Oslo agreements will allow GDP growth of 6%, or 2.4% per head. Public and private investment reaching a rate close to 15% while inflation fell to 9% in 1996. Despite an average growth of exports of more than 7%, the trade deficit flies to 5% of GDP. In 1997, activity slows, the annual GDP growth fell to 2% and unemployment rising from 6.3 to more than 10%. At the same time, industrial exports increased by 10%, of which one third for high-tech industries. Israel is ranked just behind the United States for the number of start-up companies (SMEs new high-tech).

Israel is thus experiencing a profound change in its manufacturing base, leaving the industry with low capital intensity, including food, clothing, footwear, etc. The massive influx of Jews from Russia, which form a highly qualified workforce is increasing the average level of training of employees in the country, already high.

You should know that government expenditure on education is 7% of GDP, against 5% in the U.S. and 6.6% in Sweden. With this precious human capital, Israel will focus on the development of economic sectors to be more innovative. Investments in research and development (R & D) are particularly important and support this effort. In 1990, approximately 60% of export earnings came from sales of software, medical equipment, solar energy technologies for irrigation and agricultural chemicals.

GDP grew by 6% per year to 74 billion in 1994. Meanwhile, military spending had declined to less than 10% of GDP. In 2000, 8% of private sector workers employed in ICT, or about 150,000 people, providing one fifth of the total turnover of the private sector. Between 1990 and 2000, average annual growth of sales of ICT has been around 16% against 6% for the rest of the economy. During that decade, output per employee increased by 6% for the whole of the Israeli economy, 13% for the private sector alone and 68% for ICT. Main positive line of the balance of payments of the country, ICT has exported \$ 14 billion (30% of total exports) and imported \$ 7 billion in 2000.

In the same period, Israel, taking advantage of first the existence of a civil war in Lebanon and the occupation of the latter by Syria, will become the first offshore financial center (tax free paradise) in the region and beyond. As a result of these changes, the state and the Israeli bourgeoisie can finally fully emancipated from the economic contribution of the West Bank and Gaza. And marginalize in the same time Israel Arab citizens workers.

In this connection it is recalled that in the '70s, the occupied territories had become the second market for Israeli exports, after the United States. In 1972, Israel exported to the West Bank and Gaza three times more goods than it imports.

Arabs with Israeli citizenship were massively employed in sectors of activity not related with the defense (construction, tourism and clothing). The major textile companies have moved to the north of the country to move closer to the Arab labor force, mainly women (about 15% of young Arab Israeli women had a job and half works in clothing).

In the mid-70s, Israeli Arabs (descendants of the 160,000 Palestinians who remained on their land after the creation of Israel in 1948, representing now 19% of the Israeli population, more than a million people out of a total population of 6,592,000 inhabitants) and the Palestinian from occupied territories were nearly a quarter of the workforce in Israel, they were half the jobs in construction and in services especially in hotels, garages and cleaning. The participation of these workers in strikes during the first Intifada sealed their fate. They will pay very dearly for their refusal to submit. The ruling classes of Israel operate a real reversal of strategy vis-à-vis the Palestinian proletarians of the Interior, and even more to those of the occupied territories, and, both for economic reasons than for political considerations. The State of Israel and the israelian bourgeoisie were finally able - thanks primarily to the evolution of the economics of the country - to make Palestinians unnecessary, because too dangerous and not enough qualified for the advanced economic sectors.

In spring 1993, Rabin and may impose a total blockade of the occupied territories relatively painless for the Israeli economy. Migrant workers from Asia, the countries of Eastern Europe and Latin America are rapidly replacing Palestinian proletarians. Today, Israel has about 300,000 workers from Romania, Thailand, Philippines, China, Turkey, Latin America, etc..

Despite this, during the past five years, about 100,000 Palestinian workers would still be able to enter Israel illegally. The remittances of these illegal immigrants are absolutely crucial for the survival of large swathes of the poor population of the occupied territories. It can not be said for those few thousand Palestinians from Gaza and the West Bank that are still allowed to work in Israel.

### ***Palestina : a towards disparition economy***

Since the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, the economy of these territories has developed a way of increasing dependence on that of Israel. The companies were created to perform subcontracting, particularly in the clothingsector. Before September 2000, Israel exported 2.5 of 3.5 billion Palestinian imports. Some 500 of the 800 million dollars of total Palestinian exports were destined for Israel.

Many Palestinian workers were employed in Israel. According to Gil Bufman, chief economist of Leumi Bank, in 1991/1992, some 200,000 Palestinian workers were legal immigrants in Israel and probably an equivalent figure was made up of illegal immigrants. In the 1990s, about 65% of Palestinian families was dependent on the Israeli labor market. Despite this dependency or with it the situation of workers has slowly improved. Although well below the living conditions in Israel, the occupied territories are well above those of other countries in the region.

*Palestinian population (in 2001)*

Country	TOTAL PALESTI NIANS	REFUGEES		% refugees/Total refugees	% refugees/ country population	Refugees number
		Out Camps	In Camps			
LEBANON	501,431	168,245	246,755	10	31	415,000
SYRIA	463,227	174,258	240,752	10	2,6	415,000
JORDAN	2,560,267	1,351,767	391,233	42	33,69	1,743,000
West Bank	2,057,245	398,154	239,092	16	31	637,246
GAZA	1,167,359	392,595	548,296	22	80,6	940,891
ISRAEL	1,131,211	0	0	0	0	0
Other Arab countries	588,638	0	0	0	0	0
USA and other countries	486,319	0	0	0	0	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>8,955,697</b>	2 485 019	1 666 118	100	Out of scope	<b>4 151 137</b>

The Palestinian economy has deteriorated since the Oslo agreements, particularly because of the compression of the number of borde workers authorized by the Israeli authorities. They were 28,100 in 1996, 52,000 in September 2000, 4,000 at the end of 2000, 39,000 at the end of 2001; 15,000 in September 2002 and 25,000 currently.

Much more than the Israeli economy, the Palestinian economy has always lived under foreign infusion. Since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1994 and until 2000, it received an average of \$ 500 million per year of various external aid. This amount represented about 1/8th of GDP in the West Bank and Gaza and a third of entries the Authority fund. This dependence on external aid has increased tremendously since then. In 2002, payments of the United States, Europe and Arab countries amounted to 900 million dollars. Other external grants originally designed to support the economy of around 1.2 billion this year, have become a feature of social assistance. During the first months of the second intifada, unemployment in the occupied territories had remained stable between 290,000 and 320,000 people. But lately it has accelerated significantly by climbing to 370,000, corresponding to about half the workforce.

The poverty rate is 60%. GDP per capita has fallen below 800 dollars. The World Bank estimates losses for the Palestinian economy for the sixteen months of the intifada amounted to 2.4 billion dollars. Just to pay the 130,000 staff (including 50,000 agents of police forces) of the Palestinian Authority, we need 60 million dollars per month. In late 2001, the AP had 430 million dollars in arrears. Moreover, this quasi-state must return \$ 50 million every month to Israel under the taxes on imported products and contributions from Palestinians working in Israel.

Therefore, the Palestinian Authority is bankrupt because of its austerity budget passed in March 2001 requires \$ 90 million per month, while his monthly income is less than \$ 20 million.

Some data on the Palestinians and the Occupied Territories (West Bank and Gaza).

In the 1990s, the industry accounted for 9% of GDP of the occupied territories, agriculture 14%, 16% construction and utilities 12%. The remaining 50% came from trade, transport and services to individuals, ie small businesses. Over 95% of industrial production also came from small and medium enterprises. According to the Bureau of Statistics, GDP was \$ 4 billion in 2000 to 580 million below expectations due to various border closures. Palestinian exports may not, in most Arab countries enter without being taxed, as in the United States and Europe. Families whose incomes are most important in descending order are those whose head is working in the public service, in family enterprises, as immigrants or border in the private sector, and those who live assistance.

Infant mortality in 1997: Israel 6 per 1,000 births; occupied territories; 15, Jordan 20, Egypt 54, 64 on average for all developing countries. Life expectancy reached 73 years against 78 in Israel, 72 in Lebanon, 70 in Jordan and 66 in Egypt. Number of years of schooling is an average of 8.1 from 5.5 in Egypt, 6.9 in Jordan. Some 89% of the inhabitants of the occupied territories have electricity and 85% water. Round 90% of Palestinians own their home or occupy without paying rent. In the first half of 2000, the total daily income of 125,000 legal workers was estimated at 3.4 million \$, or nearly 30% of Territories GDP.

In 1998, repartition of Palestinian workers was as follows:

\* employed in Israel or in settlements: 21.7%

\* public sector: 16.4% (figures in Gaza are twice ones in West Bank)

\* agriculture: 12.1% (between 1948 and 1967, population doubled while working in agriculture were halved from 70 to 35%. In the 80's, it reached under 10%

\* industry: 15.9%

Women make up less than 14% of employed workforce.

### ***AT THE ORIGINS OF SECOND INTIFADA***

For the first time in years, the latest revival of the armed confrontation between the two peoples and their States has not been encouraged or determined by the intrusion of imperialist interests. On the opposite, it comes from the simultaneous crisis among traditional centers of war impulse between the two peoples. It is widely accepted that the beginning of the second Intifada coincided with the incursion of 28 September 2000 of the one who was then the head of the right-wing opposition, Ariel Sharon, on the Esplanade of the Mosques in East Jerusalem third holiest site in Islam. The area, called by Jews the Temple Mount, is also the most sacred in Judaism. In the Old City, Palestinian demonstrators, carrying stones, then opposed to Israeli police who responded with rubber bullets. Balance sheet: four Palestinians wounded.

The provocation of the current Israeli prime minister was in response to the explosion, September 27, of two bombs at a passing military convoy in the Gaza Strip who made one death among the soldiers. Clinton envoy, Dennis Ross, failed to convince Ehud Barak to prohibit the promenade of the butcher of the Palestinian camps of Sabra and Shatila (Lebanon), in 1982. Barak justified his refusal to obey the injunction by the U.S. that the issue "was the internal politics of the country."

The act of Sharon is due to the attempt to finally defeat the remnants of previous agreements between the two states Israel and Palestine and to arise as the only candidate of his party, the Likud against Netanyahu. This operation, highly symbolic, aimed at destabilizing, a few times from the legislative elections, the dying Barak government and to win the support from the army, still hesitant about the way forward after the failure of the Camp David summit of July 2000 under the leadership of U.S. President Bill Clinton.

Since then, both sides were eager to prepare the current conflict, as shown by the statements of Palestinian Minister of Communications at the time, Imad al-Falouji, who said that his camp had prepared the new intifada from mid-2000. The first clashes took place on 29 September on the Esplanade of the Mosques. This time, Israeli police opened fire with live bullets at Palestinian demonstrators, killing seven and injuring more in 200.

The Palestinian Authority immediately called a general strike to protest in the West Bank and Gaza for the next day, September 30. The strike massively followed gives rise to violent incidents that result in fifteen Palestinian deaths. Following is familiar: the street battles stroke stone turning quickly to the benefit of the Israeli army, with thousands of police officers available to the Palestinian Authority are quickly swept away, the phase of attacks against the population living in Israel starts without preventing the extension and continuation of the occupation by the Israeli army from the territories assigned to Palestinians by the Oslo agreements.

At the end of August, some 1,700 Palestinians lost their lives in this conflict, as well as about 450 people in Israel, 137 Israeli settlers and a few dozen soldiers from the Israeli army. According to a **macabre** calculation constantly updated by the Israeli army, the first intifada had made 1,162 deaths among Palestinians, against 174 Israelis, a ratio of 6.7 Palestinians for every Israeli killed. In the first six months of the second intifada, this ratio was 5.1.

But since the wave of blind attacks in March 2001, this ratio has clearly turned to the "advantage" of supporters of this abhorrent means of combat: 1.7 Palestinian died for every Israeli killed. This despicable tactic was awarded a certificate of efficiency by one of the most prestigious imperialist institutions in the military doctrine, the London International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). "Easy to organize and harder to prevent, suicide attacks have been very effective in creating uncertainty and causing psychological damage among the Israeli population, significantly undermining morale," said the Institute in its 2002-2003 report on status of forces in the world.

### ***THE BLOODY DEAD-END OF NATIONALISM***

#### *On Palestinian side*

The destitute Palestinian nationalism dates back to early last century. For a new bourgeois sovereign state can be born, it is necessary that the social forces which this break with the international division of labor driven by the colonial and imperialist domination, to change depending on the emergence of a real internal market.

Dependency relationships maintained until then by the indigenous ruling classes that develop in the interstices of the colonial and imperialist chain must be revised to the advantage of nations, under penalty, otherwise, of the pursuit only under conditions superficially changed of external domination. We must, in sum, that the national liberation movement not only confronts or the dominant powers, but also its own upper classes fattened by the former. Moreover, in front of modern imperialism - the supremacy of which is expressed mainly by unequal exchanges with the dominated countries based on a higher social work productivity -, it is vital for these movements to represent the potential of social productive forces capable of ensuring the development process of the internal market . National liberation is not primarily a question of military force (even if this aspect is not to be excluded) but rather of the texture of economic formation in development. This explains why, despite the many nationalists yawning in countries locked at the bottom of the world hierarchy of Labor, the national liberation struggles have failed, even when they have led to the establishment of legally Independent States. We must, in sum, that the national liberation movement not only the faces or the dominant powers, but also its own upper classes fattened by the former. Moreover, in the face of modern imperialism? the supremacy of which is expressed mainly by unequal exchanges with the countries dominated productivity based on a higher social work?, it is vital for these movements represent the potential of social productive forces capable of ensuring the development process of the internal market .

As such, the example of the Palestinian national movement is telling. After all attempts failed to escape from the domination of the Ottoman Empire ended with the fall of the latter in 1919-1921, the Arab ruling classes and the Palestinian national movement joined continuously forces to new english boss. In exchange for the unwavering loyalty, United Kingdom has never granted its support to Palestinians. Yet between 1921 and 1947, they were well supported, by numerous anti-Semitic and xenophobic, British occupation in its attempt to curb Jewish immigration and the fight for the establishment of a "Jewish national home in Palestine."



When between May 1936 and April 1937, an Arab uprising occurs - more directed against the Jews than against the English - Palestinian ruling classes adhere weakly. The English occupants, followers of the precept of "divide and rule", then recruit several thousand Jews for their auxiliary police. Any attempt to unify practice between Jewish and Palestinian workers, as in the high oil refinery in Haifa, in 1946-47, was fought by the Palestinian officials paid by English, finding on this occasion, precious allied with right and extreme right Zionists. The historic occasion of a battle between Palestinian masses and 'unqualified' Jews escaping from the persecution they suffered both in Central and Eastern Europe than in many Arab countries will never be truly seized, with terrible consequences are before us today. When between May 1936 and April 1937, an uprising occurs Arabs - more directed against the Jews against the English? Palestinian ruling classes adhere weakly.

The development of political Zionism with the masses of the Jewish world and the consequent birth of the State of Israel are the direct products, first of the abuses suffered here and elsewhere by the Jews and then the submission of the Palestinian movement English power.

During the first battle in 1948 against the Jewish militias, the Palestinian movement dominated by cliques of landowners and trade capitalists Arabs in thrall to the British showed any intrinsic weakness: its main military force, Abdallah's army, preferring to steer with the Zionist enemy in exchange for a promise not to be concerned about its backyard: Jordan.

Finally dismissed and, more importantly, swept on the economic ground by modern Jewish triumphant bourgeoisie, the former Palestinian ruling classes, from the 1960s, gradually give way to the generation of the camps and exile.

This one came mainly from small and medium impoverished Palestinian bourgeoisie, systematically persecuted and discriminated by the new Zionist state. The PLO became the central political expression of those middle-classes impoverished, persecuted and displaced by the State of Israel. Unable of producing a program of national liberation worthy of the name, these layers, through the PLO and other components of the new Palestinian national movement, aimed only at the conquest of a territory to settle their police, their justice their rackets at the expense of Palestinian proletarians. In perfect continuity with the former Palestinian national movement, the new leaders will rule out unification project with the Jewish working class and revivals of old anti-Semitism barely disguised, emphasizing, however, work for USSR, and especially for the Arab States of the region.

By September 1970, when the PLO Arafat abandoned revolted proletarians Palestinian in Irbid in favor of King Hussein, through 1976 and 1982, each time, the PLO preferred begging recognition among world powers rather than to place alongside fighting proletarians. And it is because of this policy that the PLO was granted by the Oslo agreements, including the granting of fake autonomy. A final mark of goodwill and openness will be sought in exchange for a small territory where exercise his talents: formally renounce to the return of refugees from Lebanon, too restless.

Unfortunately, as often in such situations, in the absence of a strong worldwide proletarian movement, Palestinian proletarians have first followed the clique of the PLO and Hamas (undeclared ally of Israel, when it comes to score points against the political opponent of PLO), then of Palestinian Authority established in the territories of Gaza and the West Bank. The hopes of the proletariat and the poor Palestinians have been quickly dashed. The Authority has so wallowed in corruption, nepotism and arrogance, diverting its exclusive benefit of the many money external aid granted by countries including Arab, European Union, the United States and even Israel.

The approximately 50,000 upstarts – among three million inhabitants of the territories - belonging to the Authority armed forces (including many veterans of the first intifada) were rewarded for their work of containing and punishment of the poor Palestinian masses by means of lavish meal in the middle of the huge refugees camp that Gaza is, of luxury consumer goods (cars, etc.) and housing of a quality uncommensurate with that of wretched dwellings of the great mass of Palestinians. When some of them clashed with the opposite army with an obvious ineffectiveness during the second intifada, the unnecessary, harmful and parasites aspect of Arafat militiamen broke openly.

That is this distaste for the pseudo state, associated with the military might of the Israeli occupation, which may explain, beyond personal revenges and greed, in a general context of despair, the high number - including a camp with strong traditions of struggle as Jenin - of informants of the occupation army.

So to continue to claim, citing the catch-all precept of the "right of peoples to self-determination", a state for Palestinians, obscures the fact that, including in the territories subject to the Authority, class interests are opposed. What is the use for proletarians Palestinian of a State unable to create conditions so that more people can survive with dignity, which is unable to prevent the demolition of houses by the Israeli army, the deprivation of water and electricity and no way does the free movement of its citizens and the opportunity to work in Israel?

The occupation does not explain everything. The greatest responsibility of the Authority is to spread the illusion that a Palestinian state within the framework of the Oslo agreements is sustainable and conducive to improving the fate of poor masses.

And there is little evidence that the existence of an ersatz State is a stronger military defense to face the Israeli aggression. During the first Intifada, when the state of Arafat did not exist and therefore the boundaries were poorly defined, massive strikes involving up to 60,000 workers had paralyzed the Palestinian construction and agriculture in Israel.

The production of several industrial civilian companies had also been affected. During the first years of the intifada, the israelian economy has lost \$ 650 million in exports. Neither the armed struggle, or compromise with the imperialist powers can replace the weapon of class struggle.

#### *By israelian side*

The State of Israel has contradictory characteristics. On the one hand, it was a parliamentary democracy fully deployed.

On one hand, an Arab member can speak in Arabic at the Knesset in support for suicide bombings. The small parties can bring down governments. Freedom of expression, including dissonant voices with the policy of ethnic cleansing of the State, is generally assured. When you make concrete act of desertion, you could certainly risk dismissal and imprisonment, but not (yet) the death or torture systematically.

On the other hand, the state of Israel excludes from decision centers representatives of a significant minority of these citizens - Israeli Arabs and Druze- and organizes the segregation of Palestinians.

Israel is a modern democratic state in a permanent status of civil and social war. It is based on racial and religious discrimination, despite its initial professions of faith of secularism and racial tolerance

The state of permanent war is reflected in the habituation of the ruling classes to violent settling of accounts (see the assassination of Rabin in 1995, gunfire exchanged between delegates from the last convention of the Likud). To achieve their ends, the different fractions of ruling class are never reluctant to use extra-institutional means, like the "walk" of Sharon to the mosque in Jerusalem which was the origin of the second intifada .

The "normal" operation of modern bourgeois democracy is now hampered by some social and political foundations of the State of Israel, the religious and the settlers. There are about 221,000 students from the Torah. With their large families (the religious fertility is equal to that of poor Palestinians, 7 children per household), the "world" of religion in schools represents nearly a million Israelis. If they are an ideological and social highlight of racial and religious discrimination against the Palestinians inside and outside, the fact remains that their maintenance cost is extremely high, since most of them refusing to both work and integrate the military.

Some 380,000 settlers (207,000 in the West Bank and 7,000 in Gaza and the rest in East Jerusalem) are in many respects in the same situation. Their role of social and military control in the Occupied Territories is well known, real thorn in the side of the Palestinians and permanent factor of conflict between the two populations, they occupy 42% of the West Bank. However, they represent a major

obstacle to the establishment of a sufficient sealing of the borders between the territories and Israel and their defense is a first in military expenditures of the state.

The phenomenon of colonization is also increasingly difficult to manage because, especially around Jerusalem, the new settlers are reluctant to provide their law enforcement duties but cling to the benefits associated with their condition (1,000 to 2,000 dollars per year by State grant for each settler, housing assistance, cheaper utilities, go back to work programs, etc.). A survey of the Israeli peace group "Peace Now" shows that only 6% of the settlers refuse to leave their settlements, 2% being prepared to use force. As 59% of respondents believe that financial compensation is the best solution.

In the future, for the ruling classes of Israel, the resolution of these issues will surely be much more difficult than that - now mostly military and diplomatic - of Territories under the administration of the Palestinian Authority. It is clear that the weight of religious and settlers on the economy, the army (today, almost half of the interim officers are practicing), the politics and the ideology of Israel is not comparable to the Palestinians.

Thus, the rulers of Israel - in large part coming from and self-expression of the endless social and civil war with the Palestinians - fluctuate constantly. The choice of "peacefully resolve the Palestinian question" that would undermine the social and political pillars of the state and the formation of the country is constantly hampered by the desire to keep the situation the same. The serious risks of destabilization of the foundations of Israel combined with a restructuring of the country's civil society are today the main obstacle to a negotiated end to the recent conflict with the Palestinian Authority.

Suicide attacks, claims by the PLO for the return of exiles and a piece of Jerusalem are, in this context, the function of pretexts - certainly not negligible - to maintain the situation. They are not the only cause.

Faced with the consequences of the crisis, fighting spirit of a significant fraction of the Israeli working class (140,000 state and municipal employees on strike for wages since mid-October), despite the tremendous pressure for national unity produced by anti - proletarian terrorist massacres in Israel adds a major complicating factor for the Israeli bourgeoisie. Unfortunately for the proletarian cause, the Palestinian workers can no longer make direct contribution to the building of the class struggle in Israel because they are mostly already out of work and subject to segregation in the territories. Segregation reinforced by building a waterproof wall of separation between the territories and suicide attacks Israel

### ***WORKERS CAUGHT BETWEEN TWO TERRORS***

First, we reiterate our opposition to any bourgeois solution of the social and civil war in Palestine that would include the formation of a binational state (issue highly unlikely given the deep divisions between the two peoples) or two ( The most likely outcome). However, in the absence of the emergence of a unified proletarian force, we should not hide that the end of hostilities could assist in the outbreak, in a second time, a class struggle more decisively in the two camps.

In this sense, the stop of fighting as they are, of their organization and their current targets could be seen as a favourable target for the proletarian cause. For this reason, the revolutionaries must support any desertion and attempt of defeatism on both sides, without losing sight of the necessary critics of democratic and pacifist illusions they inevitably create.

Resistance to the occupation and the Israeli segregation is, in the immediate future, represents the second element of a proletarian policy in the area. However, this resistance should not be conducted as it has been so far. It must coordinate efforts from Israeli opponents against the war and Israeli Arabs and Palestinians in the camps on claims and ways of fighting the most possible shared by all components. The indiscriminate terrorist attacks are now the main obstacle to extend the struggle front to the whole country. The repression of any opposition to the war in Israel is of course more legitimized by these horrific anti-proletarian attacks.

But all this is palliative care, if the proletarians of the two camps do not find back the way to class war. Only when the exploited have swept Palestinian nationalists and religious of all kind who are

acting on behalf of their ruling classes and their class Israeli brothers have done the same that war, discrimination and exploitation will make great strides back. Such an assumption for the moment sounds like wishful thinking. Yet it is the only realistic end to the endless battle between the two peoples, battle whose purpose is none other than the maintaining in power of the respective ruling classes.

Also, if one looks to the past, attempts at political unification of the proletariat on both sides did not lack. In the '70s, the Black Panthers (movement of young Jews from Sephardic origin) objected to the State of Israel in lending their hands to their Palestinian brothers. In 1982, more than 300,000 Israeli peace activists have not hesitated to show their anger against the massacres of Sabra and Shatila perpetrated by the Christian Phalange supervised by Sharon. Again this year, several hundreds of soldiers and Israeli reserve officers deserted by refusing to carry out "pacification" operations against Palestinian civilians. Apart from these developments, there will be for exploited of the area, whatever their nature, only blood and shrapnel.

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Take a look at the website of Mouvement Communiste : [www.mouvement-communiste.com](http://www.mouvement-communiste.com)