

In Iran and the US, the world proletariat returns to its path

1. The exploited class is living through one of the most crucial periods since the defeat of its last attempt to “storm the heavens” in the years 1960-1980. Since this last, third great global revolutionary wave¹, its activity has never ceased. Yet, with very few exceptions, this has not gone beyond the sacrosanct limit of the struggle for the defence of its own conditions of life and labour. The fights undertaken have either not lasted in time, or at best have not surpassed the strictly defensive framework and have not generated autonomous class organisation. During these long decades of retreat, there have been many class fighters who have deserted the class front, finding refuge in pointless confrontations with the forces of repression of various states or, worse, in a Messianic wait-and-see attitude with trivial results. Most expressions of proletarian revolt up until now have been largely inspired by democratic inter-classist movements, including several in 2025. Movements of a certain scale, often radical in their eruptive demonstrations, have spread in a great many countries on the periphery of world capital and, sometimes, in its citadels, as in the US during the Black Lives Matter movement in summer 2020. Only one moment has seen the proletariat take the head of the direct action against the state: that was in Kazakhstan, in January 2022. But there, as well, repression gained the upper hand. The revolutionary message sent out by the proletarians of this totalitarian republic in Central Asia was not received by their class brothers and sisters in other countries.
2. One exception, and of some size, needs to be underlined, that of Iran. In this large country the proletariat has never ceased revolting against the military theocracy which took power by destroying the proletarian revolution against the Pahlavis

and their regime. Since 2009, from non-authorized marches against electoral fraud, to riots against increases in the price of bread from 2017 to 2019, to the formidable insurrection of 2022 for women’s freedom, to the proletarian insurrection at the beginning of 2026, the proletarians of Iran have engaged in a revolutionary movement of scale and duration whose class nature asserts itself more and more clearly. The revolutionary process being enacted is from now on at a decisive turning point. If the class makes itself capable of negotiating victoriously, that is going to profoundly modify the Middle Eastern and Asian arena. Above all, the call to class political combat emanating from the ongoing proletarian revolution in Iran is sure to be heard far and wide.

3. The striking characteristic of this movement is its capacity to fight despite the bloody repression which it is subjected to. Demonstrating, if this is needed, that it is not just a matter of an explosion now and again. The link between the struggle against the high cost of living and the class war against the theocratic state has been made. Productive territories and working class neighbourhoods are the bastions of revolution. At the height of the last battle, no general strike was formally called, it quite simply happened *de facto*. The absence of leaders, much deplored by the capitalist powers which want to dominate Iran, is a blatant lie. Just like the absence of organisation. The proletarians of Iran can count on tens of thousands of *avant-garde* class militants. And such endurance could not exist if the revolts could not count on extended networks, on clandestine organisations in neighbourhoods, villages, factories and elsewhere. The revolution in Iran also poses concretely the question of oppressed nationalities. The poor peasants of Iranian Kurdistan have not hesitated with their armed independentist organisations to respond, accepting a high

¹ The two previous ones were in 1848-1849 and 1917-1921.

price in blood without batting an eyelid. The murderous balance sheet of the state is commensurate with the class hatred so amply expressed.

4. In the US at the beginning of this year in Minneapolis, Minnesota, the movement against the militarisation of labour for whole sectors of the working class and whole working class neighbourhoods, implemented by the segregation and deportation of migrant workers, took a big step forward. The capacity demonstrated by proletarians in this American city to counter the preventive civil war declared by the federal government marked an important first stage. The rabid dogs of ICE had to lay low after the massive resistance of all kinds they had provoked. The political and military terrain of this resistance was imposed by the class enemy, and the movement did not back down, drawing strength from its deep rootedness, its direct actions, its mobility, and its understanding of the local situation. The ICE invaders paid the political price, and Washington was forced to revert to the more discreet methods (though no less aggressive toward migrant workers) of the two previous Democratic administrations. The diffuse self-organization of the resistance emerged victorious from this first major confrontation. Here too, as in Iran, it is a matter of an organised mass movement that combines the element of defence with that of political offence, expressed in its ability to thwart repression in the places of production and reproduction in working class neighbourhoods. In Minneapolis, political resistance to the preventive civil war declared by the present Federal administration has reached its highest point. But examples headed in the same direction happened to some extent everywhere on US soil, since the first rebellion in Paramount and Compton, in Los Angeles County, on 6 and 7 June 2025.
5. It goes without saying that the proletarian revolution in Iran and the resistance of workers in the US are not at the same stage of development. The one is very advanced, the other has only been implanted for a year. The first already aims explicitly at the destruction of the existing state, the other attacks the anti-worker political consequences of the strategy of the federal administration of preventive civil war. However, these two phases of the

proletarian political cycle bring to the fore—without yet providing any definitive indication one way or the other—the concrete possibility that the world proletariat might return to the path of autonomy and class war. After having reached its lowest point since the last revolutionary period in the years 1960-1980, it is thus possible that the exploited class is standing up again and reclaiming the place which is historically its own in the fighting path for and towards communism.

6. Finally, we should stress that the objective conditions today are more favourable than ever since the last revolutionary wave. The world order has been violently shaken since the financial crisis of 2007–2008, the most severe in the history of capitalism since that of 1929–1931. The pandemic at the start of this decade further undermined the dominant order by significantly exacerbating the fiscal crisis of states. The financial constraint weighing on these governments has led them, almost everywhere, to scale back social protection mechanisms and to militarise entire segments of civil society. Preventive civil war has become the necessary counterpart to the evolution of liberal parliamentary democracies toward so-called “illiberal” plebiscitary democracy, the antechamber of fascist regimes. The fiscal crisis has sparked, across four of the world’s five continents, repeated uprisings and riots, sometimes driven by hunger, sometimes directed against monopolistic and “corrupt” states, and sometimes in response to restrictions on individual and collective freedoms. The list of these outbursts is long and has persisted for decades, so that we can legitimately speak of a long cycle of inter-classist democratic movements. While the valorisation of capital has not yet been called into question, the fiscal and political crisis of states and ruling classes, coupled with the emergence of a new global power in China, has led to the undermining of global market, monetary, and, ultimately, politico-military balances.

The course towards war is the inevitable consequence. This appears in the proliferation of large-scale armed conflicts and in overt and unambiguous currency and trade wars. The constitution of two blocs – one centred on the US, the other on China – which are destined sooner or later to clash directly, severely

damages the process of capital accumulation, which must adapt rapidly to this new context which is unprecedented since the collapse of the Soviet empire. The formation of prices of production is subject to multiple distortions due to the new obstacles placed in the way of the competitive movement of capital as a whole. States are consolidating and expanding their dominance over the individual capitals of the countries they represent. State capitalism triumphs everywhere, with its corollary of imperialist ambitions.

The period is therefore marked by the course to world war. But in Iran and the US, the proletariat shows that the coming carnage is not inevitable, on condition that the message of class war that the dispossessed of these two countries give to their class brothers and sisters in all regions is applied. The proletarian revolution initiated in Iran and the workers' resistance in the US do not have the strength, in themselves, to transform the coming imperialist war into a class civil war but it is certainly this perspective which can open up today. Revolutionaries must work and actively prepare themselves in this direction. Proletarians in Iran and the US have defined, in the heat of their struggles, their political strategy. It is up to revolutionaries to reinforce the tactical plans of the offensive by their participation without reserve in the movements going on now.

The insurrectionary movement in Iran

The insurrectionary movement of December 2025 and January 2026 in Iran is the most recent episode in a long cycle of class struggles, for freedom and against the state theocracy. This cycle opened with a student movement in 1999, against the closure of a "reforming" bourgeois newspaper. This first moment still fitted within the political limits imposed by the regime, but it was nevertheless crushed by a brutal repression. In the following years the high points of the cycle were: 2009, against the election of Ahmadinejad; winter 2018-2019, against the high cost of living; and finally in September 2022 to February 2023, against the compulsory wearing of headscarves and the brutality of the patrols which enforced it.

Outside these high points, struggles in Iran were numerous and took many forms. In particular, workers' struggles arose with regularity, despite often being drowned in blood. We can point to the mass strikes by workers in the logistics and oil sectors in Asaluyeh in 2021. Certainly, the oil sector employs very few workers in the country but their labour accounts for 60% of state revenue. Other examples: struggles for access to water, or even the protests after the Revolutionary Guards shot down a civil aircraft in January 2020.

If we can categorise these movements, we can see two different natures, sometimes mixed together, sometimes contradictory. On one side, the immediately political inter-classist movements, for freedom, which, at first anyway, express a desire for reform in negotiation with the state. Up until the movement of 2009, these negotiations were led by the mediation of politicians said to be reformers coming out of the regime, even if some of them paid the price for this opposition by being pushed aside. After 2009, the reformers were progressively discredited, losing their capacity to channel the political conflict. The movement against the wearing of headscarves went over to the immediate practice of freedom. Nevertheless, such actions, however antagonistic they may be to the established order, do not in themselves constitute an attack on the regime's existence. They remain a moment of negotiation over freedoms, even if rooted in a real balance of power. On the other side, there are defensive movements concerning material living conditions, often more explosive in their expression, more intense, and against which repression escalates into violence more rapidly.

The most recent movement started on 28 December 2025, among the sellers of electronic goods in Tehran. The detonator was the fall in the rate of exchange of the rial against the US dollar. The fall was even more dramatic given that the greenback was itself in a phase of depreciation relative to several currencies of advanced countries. This volatility of the exchange rate of the rial made the trade in imported goods simply impossible. The *bazaari* therefore rolled down the shutters to protest against the economic policy of the state. The Bazaar has a strong political history, its role being vital in the counter-revolution of 1979. Since then, its political power has been considerably reduced because of the transformation of Iran's productive structure.

Today, we see an independent private sector made up of numerous very small businesses operating alongside a bloated state-owned sector which, through the *Pasdaran* and charitable foundations, controls the relatively more capital-intensive, and therefore more productive, businesses.

Starting from this spark, protests spread to the whole country in less than a week. Students played the role of a decisive accelerator. The student movement not only took over a growing number of universities spread across the whole national territory but, above all, concretely made the link between material demands and the political struggle against the theocratic state.

In small towns and villages, the connection was also made with poor peasants, who were facing growing hardship, exacerbated by drought and a severe water shortage in the summer of 2025. The situation is particularly dire in Iranian Kurdistan, which has been at the forefront of the fighting both during the 2022–2023 uprising and at present. For the Kurds, there is also the question of national independence. And they are not alone in Iran. On the periphery of the Persian centre, which accounts for only 50 to 60% of the population, several minorities are present and oppressed by the regime. The Azeris, Baluchis, Arabs, Turkmen and Lurs are the most numerous, alongside other nomadic and sedentary peoples.

From 31 December, confrontations between protesters and the forces of repression took place in numerous places across the country. The forces of repression began to use firearms, here and there. On 6 January, faced with rising protests and lacking the manpower to guarantee repression, the state abandoned villages and small towns, such as Abdanan and Malekshahi, to the protesters. These towns are in the province of Ilam, where there is an important presence of Kurds and Lurs. This province is therefore at the centre of the fighting. In Kermanshah, acts of insubordination within the police were reported.

In the following days, during night-time demonstrations against symbols of power – mosques, seminaries, *Basiji* bases and police stations – protesters confronted the forces of repression, who suffered many losses. This led to them increasingly using real bullets, particularly in Ilam province. Tehran alone experienced 38 demonstrations from 7 to 8

January, including at least one which was fired on with real bullets.

The proletariat is hit hard by rampant inflation, which acts as a catalyst for class struggle. Pauperised middle layers join in the fight. The rebellion is thus widespread and massive, unfolding in the streets after dark. Most of the fighting takes place on the outskirts of major cities, where proletarians live. From the point of view of class composition, this revolt was purely proletarian. The absence of any declared strike in big units of production, while regrettable, must be qualified by the fact that the economic structure of the country is overwhelmingly composed of small businesses, of poor peasants and of unemployed people active in the grey economy, estimated at around 25% of GDP. Participation in these mass demos meant that *de facto* a significant part of the economy shut down.

On the night of 9-10 January, after the cutting of the internet, phone lines, and even payment networks, the forces of repression committed what is very probably the most significant massacre in modern Iranian history. The regime showed that it was fully conscious of the revolutionary potential of the movement.

Shooting on sight, killing the wounded, stopping them getting to hospital, the forces of repression killed tens of thousands, whether protesters or just passers-by. Tens of thousands were arrested and imprisoned. The Iranian public prosecutor publicly accused the prisoners of the crime of *moharebeh* – literally “waging war on God” – which is subject to the death penalty.

Although, initially, repression was enough to contain the movement, as the 40-day anniversary of the crackdown approached, from 16 February onwards, acts of defiance resumed, gradually turning into demonstrations. In Iranian tradition a funeral ceremony must be held 40 days after death. The state tried to coopt the relatives of the victims by declaring its intention to hold official ceremonies for all the supposed martyrs, the killers as well as the victims. The state forbade private ceremonies and demanded that the whole of the population join in the official ceremonies. This was in vain. The ceremonies organised by many families of victims became occasions for defiance, even confrontation.

Despite the repression, the chanting of slogans at night from the rooftops and windows of buildings never really stopped. Starting from 21 February, the movement spread in the universities, treating the attacks of the *Basij* with contempt.

Imperialist war

On the morning of 28 February, the US and Israel began a campaign of coordinated strikes against the Iranian regime. It was a matter of so-called “decapitation” strikes, carried out not only against the high command but also against their relatives and lesser-known cadres of the regime. Infrastructure and the Iranian military were also targets, with particular attention being paid to anything connected with its clandestine nuclear programme and the production chain for drones and missiles.

Right now, it is difficult to make any prediction about the outcome of the military campaign. Nevertheless, it is certain that it has frozen the revolutionary movement. The universities, points where the struggle was deeply rooted, are empty. Some have been bombed. The *Basiji* fire their automatic weapons at buildings where joyful slogans are heard. The big cities are under martial law. Part of the population, therefore part of the insurgents too, has left the city centres to seek refuge in the countryside.

The imperialist attackers have the advantage for the moment, at least on the strictly military plane. They dominate the air, they methodically destroy the military and security capacities of Iran, they eliminate leaders, they could destroy the oil industry if it suited them. The Iranian response has not caused major damage and increases the hostility of the Gulf countries against Iran.

The US aim is to mould the present Iranian regime by selecting, by force of arms, the leaders willing to quit the Chinese bloc, replicating the outcome of the military operation in Venezuela. If that proves impossible, it is probable that the US will opt for a long-lasting destabilisation of Iran, encouraging regional fragmentation and tendencies to civil war.

On the side of the Israeli state, it is a matter of ending various Iranian threats, including above all the nuclear programme, the capacity to produce missiles and drones able to

reach Israel and, finally, its support for Hezbollah and Hamas. It is also a question of militarily consolidating its status as a dominant regional power.

The Iranian strategy, in so far as it has one, is to damage through a hard war the global valorisation of capital. By attacking the production and transport of oil, in particular that of its Gulf neighbours, Iran tries to create an oil shock which could, for a second time, trigger a crisis, still latent, in the financial sphere, notably in the US – a grave financial crisis which pushes Washington to give in prematurely.

At no point is the destiny of the dispossessed in Iran taken into account in these calculations. Caught up in the bloody game between states, they have no other option but to switch allegiances to the next clique – whether theocratic, military, or authoritarian – capable of keeping them under its yoke time and time again. The Israel-US camp wages its war against the proletarians and oppressed as much as against the regime, not hesitating to hit civilian infrastructure which has little to do with the military capacities of Iran. The strike on a desalination plant, even though the country has a water shortage, puts in peril the survival of populations whose access to water is already difficult.

In the face of the bitter perspectives of the post-war period, only the revival of the class offensive offers the possibility of liberation from the present regime or its substitutes eventually domesticated by the Israel-American aggressors. It is a liberation which must be through the class war against capitalism, the social foundation of the Iranian state as with all modern states. Proletarians and more largely the oppressed of Iran have shown many times their formidable capacity to rise up again, despite the hard blows they have suffered. They need to take their destiny in hand in a direct and autonomous manner.

A revolutionary proletarian process

What is playing out in Iran now is a proletarian revolutionary process. At stake is its persistence over time and its proletarian focus. Historically, it is the first time that the defensive struggle for living conditions and the political struggle against the fascist-Islamic regime have fused in a movement. It is the clear sign of a political class struggle of the proletariat. Its

pursuit will declare the end of the counter-revolutionary cycle begun in Iran – even in 1979.

Only a military opposition force anchored in the territory and the population can overturn the regime. The scenario of a civil war could be favourable to the organised proletariat. However, we must not underestimate the forces of the enemy camp.

1. The military-religious complex

60% of the useful economy is in the hands of the *Pasdaran* (150 to 200,000 members). Their power stems from their military strength and their close ties with the clergy. The clergy (around 400,000) control so-called charitable foundations, which operate like trusts. The *Basij*, the militia, is said to number around one million, mainly poor young men from the neighbourhoods. Finally, the army, including conscripts, numbers one million people, of whom 300,000–400,000 are officers and non-commissioned officers. Furthermore, the state administration is bloated (2 to 4 million civil servants) and entirely selected on the basis of declared loyalty to the regime. Ultimately, around 20% to 30% of the population has a stake in maintaining the regime. All this constitutes a militant and military social reactionary bloc that shows no sign of fracturing as yet. Internal divisions have fallen silent since the proletarian uprising.

2. The external military intervention

If the regime is overturned from the outside, the victory will not be that of the movement but that of the external power. In such a case, the outcome will be to reinforce the idea that proletarians can count on others and not themselves, however much the supposed liberators are not the friends of proletarians in Iran or anywhere else. If the revolutionary process revives and reaches a higher phase, these same “liberators” will enthrone a mullah or a *Pasdaran* who suits them after having repressed the movement by all possible means!

3. The states of the region

If Turkey and Saudi Arabia are in regional competition with Iran, they are also capitalist states with theocratic regimes where religion plays a central ideological role. The movement which has burned dozens of mosques is not their friend. As for the Gulf monarchies, they prefer an Iran which is weak but stable. They still remember that the

movements of the Arab Spring followed close on the 2009 revolt in Iran.

The movement in Iran teaches us that a revolutionary process does not come from the heads of “thinkers” who declare from their armchairs that it must be from the start, pure, “for communism”, else it is nothing. All the movements of the past began with a variety of causes, and it was only in practice that they moved towards the destruction of the social relations of capital. They never followed a pre-determined path. They felt their way forward, evolving in response to shifts in the collective perception of the situation and the collective coalescence of proletarian energies. This movement, in all its dimensions, its errors, its torments, its vital energy in the face of deadly theocracy, is the proletarian party in the making.

UNITED STATES: In Minneapolis-Saint Paul, the proletariat asserts its power against the occupying forces of the Federal state

1. In the frozen winter of Minnesota, tens of thousands of proletarians organised themselves by their own means to defend their class brothers and sisters who were being hunted by the henchmen of President Trump. Without the burden of representatives, this proletarian mass political movement opposed its rootedness – in housing blocks, around schools or churches –, its determination, its agility and its intelligence to the unbridled brutality of the fascist mercenaries of ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement), and the Border Patrol. Although it was unable to prevent the rounding up of some 4,000 proletarian immigrants and people of colour, the workers’ resistance in Minneapolis-Saint Paul secured a resounding victory against the military occupation of working class neighbourhoods and places of exploitation, thwarting the national campaign of terror orchestrated by the federal government.

2. Like most advanced capitalist countries, the United States is finding it increasingly difficult to refinance its debt, for which it must pay ever-higher interest rates, at a time when the world is descending into chaos and war – technological, commercial and

monetary war, and, in an ever-growing number of theatres, simply war. Rivalry with Beijing is leading Washington to step up its political and military interventions and accelerate its rearmament. These considerable unproductive expenses are detrimental to social democracy, and thus to the deferred wages of the proletariat. The “One Big Beautiful Bill” of July 2025 thus includes a 12% cut in funding for the Medicaid health programme and a reduction in food aid for poor Americans, whilst allocating an additional \$150 billion to the military budget, \$170 billion to border security and the deportation of migrants, and an additional \$100 billion, over four years, for ICE operations.

3. The budgetary crisis of states and the preparation for war have as a corollary the mutation of liberal democracy into plebiscitary democracy. In the US, this mutation takes two forms: the centralisation of power in the hands of the President (at the expense of Congress, the judiciary and the constituent states of the Union) and preventive civil war against the proletariat. To subdue it, the Trump government is equipped with a new instrument: the ICE federal agency of repression of immigration which it has transformed into a political army of civil war. ICE now recruits on the basis of ideological adhesion, high wages and the promise of immunity from prosecution. Members of fascist militias like the Proud Boys have joined its ranks. Redeployed inside the country after the southern frontier was almost hermetically sealed, the Border Patrol, known for its violent methods, operates by its side.

4. These shock troops have been charged with terrorising the sectors of the proletariat who are most vulnerable, because of their irregular situation, and anyone who gets in their way. In the Republican states they can count on the open support of the local authorities. But the main anti-immigration operations are rolled out in the localities and territories run by the Democratic Party where it has adopted the policy of “sanctuary” cities or states. This means that it doesn’t cooperate, or not so

much, with the federal agencies of repression of immigration – something which a presidential decree of 28 April last year described as “illegal insurrection against federal law”. In Los Angeles (June-July) and Chicago (September-November) in particular, attacks by ICE have provoked an organised resistance and repeated confrontations. With more or less force, an open class hatred is expressed everywhere it goes in the four corners of the US, including in a medium sized town like Portland, Maine. Every example feeds the others.

5. In the twin rebellious cities of Minnesota, where the great wave of contestation of summer 2020 started, after the murder of George Floyd by the city police, the White House’s thugs encountered an even more vigorous resistance, supported by the experience of past struggles. In June and November 2025, before Operation Metro Surge began, the first immigration police raids in Minneapolis and Saint Paul had already sparked crowd gatherings and a hostile reaction. In December, hundreds of federal agents were sent into the metropolitan area to carry out, according to government propaganda, “the largest anti-immigration operation ever conducted”, and clashes multiplied. Networks of surveillance, intervention and solidarity wove a dense web across working class neighbourhoods to document, slow down or prevent arrests, and to come to the aid of besieged immigrant families. In early January, 2,000 reinforcements were dispatched to the area to quell the resistance.

6. Each escalation of state violence has met a stronger response from the movement. After the murder of Renee Good (7 January), the shooting of Julio Sosa Celis (14 January) and the execution of Alex Pretti (24 January), furious crowds have chased the Federal agents from their crime scenes, along with the local forces of repression trying to protect them, freeing, at least temporarily, the street from occupation. On 23 January, more than 300,000 workers in Minnesota took part in

an undeclared general strike (i.e. a wildcat strike); between 50 and 100 thousand protested in the streets of Minneapolis despite the terrible cold. The escalating intensity of the conflict has neither divided nor isolated this massive, widespread movement. On the contrary, it has drawn in ever-broader sectors of civil society and gained popularity, both locally and nationally. In the struggle, the committed workers have constituted a formidable collective intelligence, marked by resolve, generosity, and ingenuity. Instead of the expected fear and submission, ICE found itself facing an entire city determined to stand in its way.

7. In the days following the death of Pretti, some big bosses and Republican office holders called for deescalation. The class enemy put its differences aside to reestablish a fragile social peace, while focusing on the military campaign against the Iranian theocracy. The Trump administration clearly reached an agreement with Minnesota Governor Tim Walz, and Minneapolis Mayor Jacob Frey, both Democrats, to orchestrate a sudden shift in rhetoric and tactics, which cost Border Patrol Commander Greg Bovino his job and, a few weeks later, Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem her position. In exchange for access to county jails and increased cooperation with local law enforcement – effectively ending the “sanctuary” policy – ICE withdrew most of its personnel from the Twin Cities and generally adopted a more low-profile approach, operating in areas of least resistance. This return to the practices in place during the Obama administration, with more targeted arrests and deportations, has resulted in a slight decline in deportations nationwide. Unfortunately, it also appears to have succeeded in demobilising the movement, which was already suffering from burnout among some of its members.

8. Conscious of this retreat, the more advanced revolutionary elements of the resistance in Minneapolis-Saint Paul organised a “week of action” at the end of

February to keep up pressure on the forces of repression and spread the accumulated political experience, notably the organisation of networks for rapid intervention, among militants coming from rural areas of Minnesota or other parts of the US. With ICE less present and less visible in the streets, the movement debates new political objectives, like the question of the fight against the prison complex or in workplaces, how to block all collaboration with federal agents targeting workers, or even to attack house rent as thousands of immigrant families, in hiding and without income for many weeks, are threatened with eviction. This localised yet sustained resistance against the US federal government’s measures reveals the vitality of the proletariat right in the heart of one of the bastions of the CMP. Right there, where others deplore its absence, or even disappearance, the example of Minneapolis-Saint Paul shows that when proletarians decide to stand up and organise, they can push back the class enemy, and even, at times, secure victories.

Paris, 23 March 2026